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This paper discusses the interrelations between physics and biology. Particularly, we analyse the
approaches for reconstructing the emergent properties of physical or biological systems. We propose
approaches to scale emergence according to the degree of state-dependency of the system’s component
properties. Since the component properties of biological systems are state-dependent to a high extent,
biological emergence should be considered as very strong emergence e i.e. its reconstruction would
require a lot of information about state-dependency of its component properties. However, due to its
complexity and volume, this information cannot be handled in the naked human brain, or on the back of
an envelope. To solve this problem, biological emergence can be reconstructed in silico based on
experimentally determined rate laws and parameter values of the living cell.
According to some rough calculations, the silicon human might comprise the mathematical descrip-
tions of around 105 interactions. This is not a small number, but taking into account the exponentially
increase of computational power, it should not prove to be our principal limitation. The bigger challenges
will be located in different areas. For example they may be related to the observer effect e the limitation
to measuring a system’s component properties without affecting the system. Another obstacle may be
hidden in the tradition of "shaving away" all “unnecessary” assumptions (the so-called Occam’s razor)
that, in fact, reﬂects the intention to model the system as simply as possible and thus to deem the
emergence to be less strong than it possibly is. We argue here that that Occam’s razor should be replaced
with the law of completeness.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Contemporary biology rests on often precise information about
the cell and its biomolecular components. In order to obtain such
information one typically needs to interfere with normal cell
functioning. For instance, the standard way of quantifying the
intracellular transport of nuclear receptors (proteins which are
activated by ligands and regulate transcription) requires that cells
are transiently transfected with a plasmid over-expressing
a receptor-GFP construct. In this way, one produces a cell with
a high concentration of the receptor fused with a ﬂuorescent
marker (GFP molecule). This enables one to measure the intensity
of ﬂuorescence and to quantify the behaviour of the receptor in
time and space (Kolodkin et al., 2010). One may add a ligand and
observe the ligand-dependent shift of the receptor from the cyto-
plasm into the nucleus, quantifying the rate of its nucleo-
cytoplasmic transport. One may then bleach a certain volume of
the cell with a strong laser so that the GFP-fused receptors lose
ﬂuorescence and observe how the “bleached” receptor is replaced
with the intact one, quantifying the motility of the receptor in the
cell. One may perform various complicated experiments and get
a plethora of data quantifying aspects of life.
The above methodology comes with a big problem, however. To
what extent does the nuclear receptor in a human body behave the
same as in our experimental system? The receptor is over-
expressed, so that its concentration is altered; the receptor is
fused with a GFP molecule, giving it a different size and confor-
mation and, perhaps, causing it to interact differently with the
transport machinery; and, ﬁnally, the cell is isolated from its tissue
and exposed to excitation light. Should one not expect these
experimental procedures to affect the behaviour of the receptor?
The likely answer is that one should. Admittedly, the example was
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chosen to be an exaggerated one; many experimental methods are
much less invasive. Still, if we carefully look at the details, we can
usually ﬁnd at least one way in which they change at least some-
thing in the cell. Experiments such as the above determine prop-
erties of a cell which, during the process of experimentation,
becomes a different cell. If the biological object of study is an entire
elephant and one measures the temperature of its skin with a very
small thermometer, the perturbation caused by the experiment
may be minimized. However, if one tries to measure the behaviour
of single molecules, the perturbation tends to produce an impact on
themolecule that is of the same order of magnitude as themolecule
itself. This presents a problem particularly in attempts to measure
continuous molecular properties quantitatively.
This aspect of cell systems biology brings to mind the observer
effect in quantummechanics: “Once we have measured the system,
we know its current state and this stops it from being in one of its
other states” (Schommers and Espagnat, 1989). In other words, the
laws of physics say that if we measure a system we have already
changed the system. Does biology follow physics in this respect?
In this paper we shall examine this and a number of related
issues, extending beyond the single scientiﬁc ﬁelds of Physics or
Biology: in the next section we shall develop a more systemic,
interdisciplinary, global and philosophical look at the concept of
‘system’ itself, and discuss implications for the emergence of new
functional properties. Then, we shall introduce the concept of
function and discuss its origin. This leads us to a link between
stability and functionality, and thereby to proposing that physics
may be more part of biology than biology is part of physics. The
ﬁnal section of this paper addresses the computability of the
human body. It shows that by taking the natural organization of the
body into account, the computation reduces from astronomical to
large but feasible in a foreseeable timeframe. The consequence that
emergence of biological function becomes computable removes the
necessity of the strategy of sparsity from the life sciences. We
conclude that this should be welcome since not Occam’s razor, but
rather its opposite may apply to Biology, and perhaps then also to
Physics.
2. The concepts of system and emergence
Scientiﬁc interest in systems tends to be related to a desire to
understand, to explain or, at least, to describe the behaviour of
system components as well as the behaviour of the system as
a whole, and, ideally, to deduce the properties of the system from
the properties of the system’s components. The latter ambition
implies that one wishes to understand emergence (Rasmussen
et al., 2001; Boogerd et al. 2005). For a property of a system to be
characterised as emergent, it needs to satisfy three criteria: (i) the
thesis or notion of being a systemic (organizational) property (a
property that is not exhibited by elements in isolation), (ii) the
thesis of physical monism, and (iii) the thesis of synchronous
determinism. The thesis of it being a systemic property restricts
what can be considered as emergent. The thesis of physical monism
restricts the nature of elements. It states that the system should
consist only of physical entities, denying any supernatural inﬂu-
ences. The thesis of synchronous determinism restricts how
systemic properties and the system’s microstructure are related to
each other: it states that there can be no difference in systemic
properties without changes in the structure of the system or in the
properties of the components (Stephan, 2006). Taken together,
these theses constitute the minimal criteria for emergence.
It has become traditional to divide emergence into weak
emergence and strong emergence, depending on whether speciﬁc
behaviour of the system’s components derive or not from the
components’ behaviour in isolation and in simpler conﬁgurations
(Stephan, 2006). This separation has a deep intuitive background.
Let us consider the classic example. A piece of diamond is hard and
a piece of graphite is soft, because atoms of carbon are arranged
differently in these two systems; the emergent property (hardness
or softness) depends on the interactions between the system’s
components. If we consider a simpler conﬁguration of the system,
e.g. a small piece of diamond, we can ﬁnd the way in which atoms
of carbon should be arranged in order to give rise to hardness. In
other words, systemic properties of a big piece of diamond can be
deduced from the components’ behaviour in simpler conﬁgura-
tions. Consequently, the emergence would be classiﬁed as weak
emergence. Let us consider now a live cell. Obviously, if we cut this
cell into a hundred small pieces, each piece would be dead in
isolation. From here, we can intuitively jump to the conclusion that
the property of being alive is a strongly emergent property.
However, we may also take a look from a different angle. The
properties of carbon atoms in a diamond are the same in bigger or
smaller pieces; component properties do not depend on the state of
the system (e.g. the size and the geometrical shape of the diamond).
On the contrary, properties of macromolecules in the cell, e.g. how
macromolecules interact with each other, depend on the state of
the cell. For instance, assume that we alter the concentration of just
one component in the cell, e.g. an enzyme. This will change the
concentration of the substrates and products of this enzyme. It is
very likely that one of the substrates or products will be an acti-
vator, inhibitor or substrate for another protein. This second protein
may be the transcription factor for a different enzyme or an acti-
vator for a third protein, and the effect of the initial change will
carry on until, eventually, the properties (behaviour, concentra-
tions, activity) of all components in the cell are altered. Compo-
nents are ﬁt to the system as a whole; their properties depend on
the presence of other components, on the boundary conditions and
on the initial conditions of the cell. The component properties of
the pieces of diamond are not state-dependent. On the other hand,
the component properties of pieces of the cell are state-dependent
to a large extent. If we imagine a small piece of the cell with the
same composition of amino acids, lipids, ribonucleotides and other
molecules as the intact cell, some state-dependent information
about interactions between molecules, e.g. the information about
purposeful arrangement of these molecules as it was in the cell
would be missing in cell parts. The reconstruction of the emergent
property of the whole cell would require information about these
state-dependent properties of molecules. The emergence in the
diamond differs from that occurring in the cell by the degree to
which component properties in these two systems are state
dependent.
There is no emergence that is only weak or only strong; rather,
emergence can be stronger or weaker, depending on howmuch we
need to know about the component properties (how state depen-
dent the component properties are) in order to reconstruct this
emergence. This would also imply that, even if some properties
might seem very strongly emergent, their emergence can still be
reconstructed from the knowledge of component properties. The
real question is whether we can know all the component properties
that are engaged in the emergence.
3. Physics and stamp collecting
Many years ago, the Nobel laureate Ernest Rutherford reportedly
said: “All science is either physics or stamp collecting.” By “stamp
collecting”, Rutherford referred to chemistry, which he challenged
to become physicse a “real” science based on the universal physical
laws, rather than on the collection of more or less well-
systematized information about the elements in the periodic
system. Since then, we have stuck with the paradigm that all
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sciences are developing towards physics. Shall biology become
physics as well? When we say that logos (“word/theory”, in Greek)
should be added to biology, we are making a reference to the
rational, natural laws that govern the universe, the collection of
which comprises physics. In a ﬁrst look, biology and physics have
much in common. They both search for phenomenological relations
between different emergent properties and intend to generalize
those relations into laws. Often, emergent properties of a system
are correlated as such, without digging into the underlying mech-
anism of interactions between system components. For example, in
physics, the equation of state of a classical ideal gas formalizes the
correlation between pressure, volume and temperature. The power
of this phenomenological relation (the ideal gas law) is strong
causality, e.g. we may deﬁnitely say that an increase of volume
requires either an increase of temperature or a decrease of pressure.
However, this kind of law gives only intuitive, very slight under-
standing of how pressure and temperature really emerge from
interactions between molecules. Biology sometimes looks for
similar generalizations, although it may still lag behind physics in
this respect.
Another ambition for both physics and biology is to connect an
emergent property of a system with underlying mechanisms of
components’ interactions. For example, in physics, temperature, as
an emergent property of a whole system, may be deduced from the
kinetic energies of the components (molecules). Biology also tries
to connect biological emergent properties (e.g. the pumping
activity of the heart) with underlying component properties (e.g.
biomolecules forming a heart cell). However, compared to physics,
functional properties in biology are much more strongly emergent.
Consequently, more information is required to describe a biological
system, and, therefore, it is more difﬁcult to bring all information
together in a single analytical expression. The complicated
computer model is often the only way to reconstruct this type of
emergence. As a result, it is difﬁcult to depict clear mechanisms
underlying biological emergence and to give explanations based on
causal mechanisms.
The so-called design studies in biology are a combination of
“stamp collecting” (arrangements of particular pictures depicting
patterns) and searching for “universal laws” (Kolodkin et al., 2010).
This may provoke the thought that biology is still somewhere in the
midst of a journey towards physics. However, we would like to
argue that, in reality, biological explanation is unique. In physics,
the “main insight produced by causal-mechanical explanations is
insight into how (e.g. bymeans of what causes andmechanisms) an
event or regularity is brought about”. Biological explanation is more
related to the design question, i.e. to the question “why the
mechanism consists of the parts of which it consists, and why those
parts are organized the way they are in the context of the overall
design of the organism” (Wouters, 2007). Design implies
“purposeful arrangement of parts” (Behe, 2006) and intentionality is
already inherent in the concept of design (Blecic and Cecchini,
2008). During a design study, we imply that the system is formed
so as to enhance the emergence of useful biological functionalities.
According to Anokhin’s theory of functional systems (TFS), “a
system can be called a complex of selectively involved components
where all interactions are produced by mutual cooperation of
components focused on obtaining a useful result” (Anokhin, 1975).
The useful result as a system-forming factor may play a serious role
in systems that give rise to very strongly emergent properties (e.g.
involving consciousness) and where selection for function is
engaged. For less complex systems, the role of the useful result as
a system-forming factor may be substantially smaller. In addition,
the deﬁnition that “the goal always precedes its realization by the
organism” might be confusing (Anokhin, 1975). It is still a contro-
versial topic in the current theory of functional systems (Khitrov
and Saltykov, 2003). Curiously, this “difﬁcult” topic has migrated
into the design studies concerning artiﬁcial systems and is dis-
cussed by various authors, sometimes in direct analogywith the old
concept of Plato’s noema (428/427 BC) (Losev et al., 1993), which
can be translated from Greek as “meaning”. According to that
concept, future (not yet realised) noema becomes a current noema
in the process of noesis (realisation via the interaction with the
environment). Since current noema would be different from plan-
ned, future noema, the future noema must be readjusted and the
loop continues (Toshiharu et al., 2009). The theory of functional
systems does not operate with the term noema, but it does imply
noesis when discussing reverse afferentation (“reverse affer-
entation” meaning here a kind of “feedback”; the concept was
introduced into physiology by Anokhin). Biology took one step
further when enabling the system to select (by trial and error from
all possible combinations) those degrees of freedom of components
that lead towards a useful result (Anokhin, 1975).
What is a useful result for a physical system, and how may this
useful result become a system-forming factor?We propose that the
answer is that the useful result of a physical system is its stability.
From this point of view, the current physical universe (with its
universal laws) may be considered as a system which has already
passed the tests of stability. Countless “trial and error” universes
may have already been eliminated by stability selection, and we
would never notice the earlier existence of most of them. Func-
tional biology is a system that is stable in terms of evolutionary
changes, which can be seen as ﬂuctuations on a long time scale.
Such ﬂuctuations challenge and thereby bring about the stability of
physical systems (Westerhoff and Van Dam, 1987). The implication
is that the observable and hence also the observed physical systems
may need to or have evolved to a persistent state, and thereby have
acquired (been selected for) a design that enables them to persist
vis-à-vis the ﬂuctuations challenging their state. Function, useful
result, adaptation, and many other “biological” criteria, may
thereby not be extraneous to physics. All these concepts have been
inspired in somemeasure by biology.We therefore suggest that it is
not biology that is becoming physics. It is rather bios (“life”, in
Greek) that is being added to physics; it is physics that is on its way
to become biology.
4. Computing life
4.1. Emergence of the silicon human
There is perhaps one fundamental difference between physical
and biological systems: the components of many physical systems
are rather homogeneous, and thereby follow the same law in the
system. Consequently, physical systems can be described in terms
of rather simple equations, written on the back of an envelope. In
contrast, in a biological system, the diversity of components is
much higher and many “laws” exist that govern the interactions
between these components, which complicates the reconstruction
of biological emergence.
In fact, we can simplify biology, taking into account that the same
property of a biological systemmight be viewed as having different
strengths of emergence, the strength of emergence being related to
the way in which we model the object, or the complexity of the
components we use within the model. We can describe an object in
such a way that the property of interest is as weakly emergent as
possible. Doing this used to be considered the “art” of good
modelling: the less the component properties are state dependent,
the easier it should be to deduce them from the knowledge of
elemental properties in isolation, the less one needs to know about
the system as a whole, and the easier it should be to parameterize
the model. The model would then also be more robust against the
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changes of initial and boundary conditions (e.g. concerningmoiety-
conserved properties such as enzyme levels at the time scale of
signalling), more universal and less state-dependent.
We believe that such a reductionist approach is ﬂawed from the
perspective of the fundamental aim of biology, i.e. to understand
Life, and must therefore be challenged. Let us discuss the modelling
of a disease. We consider a certain symptom of the disease, which
might emerge from interactions in a gene regulatory network. At
one extreme, we may consider this network as a whole, with all
25,000 human genes and with thousands of mRNA and protein
molecules. In the other extreme, we can simplify reality to a system
with a single gene encoding one single enzyme with one single
substrate and one single product; the mutation of this single gene
causesmalfunctioning of an enzyme andmight cause accumulation
of the enzyme’s substrate, and be responsible for a certain
symptom. The model based on the simplest scenario is more
comprehensible and gives more straightforward predictions. In
fact, for many monogenic diseases, such a simple picture works as
a fair approximation.
There are at least three serious problemswith such an approach,
however. First, this simpliﬁcation might not work if a disease is
caused by multiple factors, both genetic and environmental, and
the neglect of the state-dependency of the component properties
could change the modelling results. In essence, the simpliﬁed
model is then simply too far from reality. Second, the simpliﬁcation
might not work because the substrate of the one enzyme is not the
metabolite causing the disease, but belongs to a pathway that is
impacted upon by the disease-causing mutation; we thus need to
determine cause versus consequence associations. Third, reduction
of the model will prevent the identiﬁcation of the important
underlying design principles for the network, meaning that we
might miss potential therapeutic targets to restore the network to
normal homeostasis.
On the other hand, we should note that the more component
properties that need to be integrated are added to the model, the
bigger the model will become. With respect to a human organism,
this approach would lead to a mechanism-based computer replica
of a whole body e the so-called silicon human (Westerhoff, 2001;
Snoep et al., 2006; Hunter et al., 2008; Westerhoff et al., 2009a;
Kolodkin et al., 2011a,b; Kolodkin et al., 2011a,b; Westerhoff et al.,
2011).
The main concerns are usually associated with the “astronom-
ical” number of interactions involved in the entire human body
(Noble, 2006). However, because of themodular organization of the
organism, the number of interactions may be large, but not quite
“astronomical”. Let us show what difference modularity makes for
the numbers. If we talk about a human being, and think about the
interactions between the 25,000 genes in each of the 1014 cells of
the whole body (2.5  1018 genes per body), then the number is
pretty high, i.e. 2:5 1018 !=2z1021019 , i.e. a 1 with 2 1019 zeros,
much larger than the number of atoms in the universe (z1080). If
we only envisage binary interactions, the number is smaller
((2.5  1018  (2.5  1018  1))/2 z 3  1036) but still enormous.
However, taking into account the modular organization of the body
and the fact that not everything may interact with everything else,
the number of interactions becomes much smaller. Let us start with
a single cell. If a cell contains about 1000 metabolic enzymes
(‘enzyme types’ really, but we assume that all enzymes deﬁned by
the same gene(s) behave as a single ensemble) and about 500
metabolites (‘metabolite types’ really, but we again assume
ensemble behaviour), maximally 5  105 binary enzyme-
metabolite interactions are possible. These are the current
numbers for yeast (Herrgard et al., 2008; Smallbone et al., 2011;
Heavner et al., 2012), but although the yeast genome is approxi-
mately 5 times smaller than, e.g. the human genome, we do not
expect much difference between organisms in terms of the number
of catalysed reactions in a single cell. In addition, 5  105 interac-
tions are an overestimation, since in reality not every enzyme can
interact with every metabolite. It is much more likely that an
enzyme interacts on average with at most 5 metabolites, bringing
down the number of metabolic interactions to only 5000.
Continuing this line of thought, there are about 3000 human
transcription factor genes. If every transcription factor binds to 100
different genes, then there are about 3000  100 ¼ 3  105 inter-
actions. If the average factor is much more speciﬁc, then this
number could be only 10,000. Together with metabolic interac-
tions, we approach the order of 104. The addition of tens of thou-
sands of interactions on the level of transporters, receptors and so
on would not change this order of magnitude of the number of
interactions in a cell substantially. Now let us go to the intercellular
level where 1014 cells are organized in tissues and organs, with
perhaps 5 cell types per organ. Let us say that each cell type
interacts with 100 neighbours via maximally 50 metabolites
(25 000 interactions), and that one organ interacts with all other 71
organs via another 50 metabolites (a little more than 3500 inter-
actions). If we sum all interactions mentioned above, there would
be still in the order of 105 interactions. This is indeed not a small
number, but taking into account increasing computational power, it
should not constitute cause for any principal limitation.
The essence of these calculations is that, if one foregoes the
natural organisation of living systems, the number of interactions
appears astronomical, but with a bit of realism, these numbers turn
out to become manageable within a few decades. Building the
silicon human will eventually break the barriers of a single science
and overcome the limitations of the human mind, delegating the
reconstruction of emergence to the computer. These days, partial
animal and bacterial silicon cell models (computer replicas based
on experimentally determined rate laws and parameter values of
the living cell; http://www.siliconcell.net/) have already helped
industry. The whole-body human silicon cell model will revolu-
tionize medicine in similar ways (Lehrach et al., 2011).
However, on the way towards the silicon human we will
encounter several fundamental problems. We have touched upon
some of them earlier. Now let us deal with them in detail.
4.2. In the light of emergence: Occam’s razor, the observer effect
and other challenges in computing and (or) understanding life
Above, we concluded that for biology one should assume
emergence to be strong rather than weak. If ones wishes to
reconstruct an emergent property, one should take into account all
knowledge about component properties. This can be formulated as
the law of completeness: “If entities A, B, C and D (e.g. proteins)
have been discovered in a living system S (e.g. cell, organism,
ecosystem) for the ﬁtness of which A, B, C, and D are all known to be
essential, and if some properties of system S can be equally well
explained either via A, B and C or via A, B, C and D, then the more
complex explanation is most likely the correct one”: “One should
not remove things without necessity” (Pluralitas non est eliminanda
sine necessitate) (Kolodkin and Westerhoff, 2011).
This contradicts the principle of parsimony, which suggests that,
if one considers a phenomenon that can be explained in two
different ways, the ﬁrst explanation requiring entities (terms,
factors, transformations etc.) A, B and C, and the second explanation
requiring entities A, B, C and D, and if one observes that both
explanations give the same result, then, entity D is unnecessary and
the simpler explanation is most likely the correct one. The parsi-
mony principle basically suggests to “shave away” all assumptions
that are unnecessary to explain the phenomenon under study. The
axiom is known as Occam’s razor in the memory of William of
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Occam (1285e1349) who suggested the following: “One should not
postulate (pose) more things without necessity” (Pluralitas non est
ponenda sine necessitate). William of Occam was a Franciscan friar
and used his razor as a tool for demythologization of the cosmology
of antique times. He worked actively to shave away the “soul” and
the “will” of cosmic elements and his legacy has cleared an avenue
for modern science. For instance, shaving away the sacred status of
stars liberated astronomers from the fear of being killed by star
worshipers and led to the discoveries of Nikolaus Kopernikus. In
later times, the statement of Occam was somewhat modiﬁed:
“Entities should not be increased (multiplied) without necessity”
(Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem) (Thorburn,
1918). This provided a good motivation to start viewing the
behaviour of physical objects as being determined by simple
physical laws rather than by divine intervention and thus became
very important for the development of physics.
However, Occam’s Razor has always been a heuristic method
rather than a universal law. There is no proof of the principle: if the
simpler explanations are true, this does not imply that those
explanations are more realistic because of any universal tendency
towards simplicity. On the contrary, the second law of thermody-
namics advocates that there is a tendency to complexity rather than
to simplicity (Westerhoff et al., 2009b). And there are many
examples where the more complex explanation turned out to be
true: chemiosmotic coupling (Mitchell, 1961), the control of
metabolic ﬂuxes (Groen et al., 1982), and general relativity
(Einstein, 1961) are but a few of them.
Coming back to biology, some years ago it became almost
a paradigm that all cellular information is stored in DNA, assuming
consequently that if one knows the DNA sequence one can deduce
all the properties of the organism. Today it is obvious that this is not
true; to show this we use the same example used by Denis Noble in
his plenary lecture of the Oxford Seminars: if one takes a carp’s
nucleus and puts it into the fertilized but enucleated egg cell of
a goldﬁsh, then, in most cases the hybrid will die. In the rare cases
that an embryo manages to develop to an adult organism, the new
organism will look like a goldﬁsh (Sun et al., 2005). The reason
behind this is that it is the cell as a whole, with all its components
including various cytoplasmic molecules (especially proteins) that
is responsible for the emergence of life. It is not downward
causation but circular causality that is at play in living systems
(Boogerd et al., 2007).
We conclude that one should not deem emergence to be less
strong than it is in living systems. One should allow component
properties of the system to be as strongly state dependent as
possible, and, most importantly, one should allow all the compo-
nents of the system to be crucial for the in silico reconstruction of
the system’s emergent properties. Only experimentation and
modelling should then deliver data that demonstrate that certain
components or interactions are not important. This principle may
apply both to internal and to external players: since biological
systems are semi-open, e.g. open to some molecules and closed to
others, and, even more remarkably, the openness is controlled by
the system itself, it is not so easy to distinguish which molecule is
external and which is a component of the system (Westerhoff and
Van Dam, 1987).
Now let us return to the problemmentioned in the introduction
concerning the idea that if one has measured a system, one has
already changed it. A corollary is that measurement of a system also
tends to ﬁxate it in its state and thereby transform its dynamics:
“once we have measured the system, we know its current state and
this stops it from being in one of its other states” (Schommers and
Espagnat, 1989). This concerns quantum mechanical objects and is
closely related with wave-particle duality, particularly with the
impossibility of measuring properties of a particle as both a wave
and a particle at the same time. We will not go into details of
quantum mechanics theory and the remarkable debates between
Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein.We simply mention that the debates
themselves started from Albert Einstein’s objections to Max Born’s
explanations of quantum physics events as being based entirely on
probability without any causal explanation. Interestingly, the
observer’s problem in quantum physics inspired Niels Bohr to
introduce the principle of Complementarity, according to which
items could be separately analysed as having several contradictory
properties, but each property is analysed in independent experi-
ments and, consequently, “cannot be comprehended within
a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the
sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible
information about the objects” (Bohr and Einstein, 1949). It is
remarkable that this may go much further than quantum physics
and may address the fundamental concerns related to the under-
standing of reality. Besides the classical Copenhagen interpretation
and the de BroglieeBohm theory, there are also theories about
transactional interpretation, objective collapse, quantum informa-
tion, time-symmetric and branching space-time, M-theory, many
worlds, many minds. Perhaps, the discussion is also related to the
concept of emergence in biology, discussed above. For example,
does the realization of a certain emergent property (from all the
stochastically possible properties) and the knowing (measuring) of
this property, stop the system from being able to exhibit other
incompatible emergent properties? Does the observation of a cell
in a certain state preclude it from exhibiting the properties of other
states?
4.3. The limitation of the human brain
The complexity of interactions even in bacteria might be higher
than the complexity of neuronal connections in the human brain.
Therefore, without the aid of a computer it may simply be impos-
sible for a single human to understand biology. Although we can
reconstruct in silico some behaviour of biological systems and
manipulate them, it is still problematic and it may be impossible for
any individual human to understand the system rationally and
completely, because again it would require that the brain under-
stands the complexity of a model that is as complex as the real
system. This implies that the computer aided understanding facil-
itated by the Silicon Human, should be different in nature, from
traditional understanding by the human brain. The mathematical
model would function as a successful predictor that can be inter-
rogated by the human brain for anything it requires explaining, not
for explaining the total behaviour all at once. Perhaps the
explaining would be that of only part of the system.
Nowadays, our world is perceived as a system composed of
related components, with each component also being a system,
composed of the next layer of components, and so on. This is our
reality, the world we live in. This viewpoint also constitutes the
foundation of our paper. Undoubtedly, this view is helpful for
industrial and medical applications. Nevertheless, we should note
that this view of the world is just a model. Whether this view
provides a real understanding of reality is an open question,
perhaps an issue for metaphysics (to discuss this in detail is thereby
out of the scope of the current paper). We brought up this issue
only in relation to the following. One might say that the recon-
struction of the emergence of life in a computer model leads one
away from understanding life, simply because one may lose the
overview of a total model. However, why would reconstructing this
emergence in one’s own brain (the type of modelling that everyone
is undertaking in everyday interaction with the outside world) give
any better understanding of reality than just reconstructing this
reality in silico?
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5. Instead of conclusions
If in 1930 A.D. somebody would have suggested that one should
be able to understand the molecules, or at least to deduce their
properties, from the interactions between hypothetical elementary
particles, the argument against this could have been the following.
‘The particles are too small to bemeasured and experiments are too
difﬁcult ever to become affordable.’ Now we realize that all these
measurements have materialized and that the real challengewas in
a “different plane”: heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the fact
that one cannot measure both the impulse and the location of an
electron in space with unlimited precision. The challenge led to
a new level of understanding of reality by approaching the problem
with quantum mechanics equations. In many ways, challenges
experienced by current biology resemble the challenge related to
the observer effect deriving from Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple in physics. This should perhaps lead biology into a systemic
change of the approaches by which it aims to understand its
systems. The challenge to compute Life and to understandwhat Life
is, is becoming a hot topic in science. As an example, we would like
to refer to vast debates around this topic in a special issue of the
journal “Origin of life and evolution of the biosphere” (Gayon et al.,
2010), to the book of Robert Rosen (Rosen,1991) and to some recent
publications (Letelier et al., 2011). Perhaps the computing of Life
would require that the approach of Occam’s razor should be
replaced with the law of completeness deriving from the concept of
emergence that we have discussed.
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